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INTRODUCTION 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,  
Inc.,1 many courts have considered, when evaluating a claim of fair use in copyright, 
whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work is “transformative,” which the 
Campbell Court described as “add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”2 
Transformativeness, the Court noted, although not required for a finding of fair 
use, furthers copyright law’s aims, lying “at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”3 Such works, in 
other words, contribute to the store of creative activity available for audiences while 
not encroaching on the ( legally created) space that copyright law reserves to the 
original author. 
In the years since Campbell, but before the Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou 
v. Prince,4 courts seem to have focused primarily on the method by which authors 
engaged in transformation rather than on exploring the values or concepts that 
might motivate a determination of transformativeness. These courts used the 
activities or thought process of the defendant: the changes he or she made to the 
 
 * Chancellor Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. Many thanks to Annemarie Bridy, 
Dan Burk, Carys Craig, Andrew Gilden, Kavita Philip, Mark Rose, Betsy Rosenblatt, Zahr Said, Jessica 
Silbey, Simon Stern, and Brooks Thomas, as well as the hosts of and participants in the “Discursive 
Turn in Copyright” symposium at UC Irvine School of Law. 
1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
2. Id. at 579. 
3. Id. 
4. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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copyrighted work or evidence of his or her artistic intent or purpose in using the 
copyrighted work in the second work. If the court detected significant aesthetic 
changes, or if the defendant could convincingly persuade the court that the 
defendant’s intended message differed from that of the original author—perhaps 
easiest to do when the second work was engaging in a parody of the first work—a 
finding of transformativeness typically followed. 
In Cariou, the Second Circuit shifted the focus of the analysis, both confirming 
that a work could be transformative even if it did not comment on the original work 
or its author and stating that the key to the transformativeness analysis is “how the 
work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might 
say about a particular piece or body of work.”5 This invocation of the “reasonable 
observer” seems to have come from the Supreme Court’s reference in Campbell to 
the “threshold question” in that case: “whether [the] parodic character [of the 
defendant’s work] may reasonably be perceived,”6 extended by the Cariou court to 
the nonparodic appropriation art at issue in that case. 
The Cariou court’s focus on the reasonable observer might be said to align 
with a reader-response approach to the transformativeness analysis. The task is to 
determine whether the second work has “alter[ed] the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message,” but that determination, in the Cariou court’s view, is 
dependent not on authorial intent but rather on audience perception. In earlier, pre-
Cariou work urging such an approach, I wrote that evidence of how readers interpret 
a work, including critical reception, would be useful in determining whether a 
separate discursive community had developed around the defendant’s work, which 
would suggest transformativeness.7 I further suggested that if such evidence was 
unavailable, “courts are well equipped to act as the ‘reasonable reader’” and answer 
the question for themselves.8 This is true as an institutional matter, since resolving 
issues of interpretation is something we expect courts to be able to do. But what 
Cariou did not answer, and what my earlier assertion neglected too easily, is the 
process by which courts should engage in this analysis. The Cariou court, for its part, 
took on this task without much in the way of explanation as to why its conclusions 
were those of a “reasonable observer,” simply concluding that twenty of the twenty-
five works at issue were, on their face, transformative, and sending the remaining 
five works back for consideration by the district court.9 
 
5. Id. at 707. 
6. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582. 
7. Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31  
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 455 (2008). 
8. Id. at 456–57; see also, e.g., Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 NYU. L. REV. 559, 
609 (2016); H. Brian Holland, Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 
360 (2011). 
9. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707–08 (“Here, looking at the artworks and the photographs side-by-
side, we conclude that Prince’s images, except for those [five] we discuss separately below, have a 
different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics with 
creative and communicative results distinct from Cariou’s.”); id. at 710–11 (noting that the remaining 
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Given the possibility that judges may act as “bad reviewers,”10 in that they may 
focus too narrowly on their own view and disregard the possibility of alternative 
interpretations, was the Cariou majority’s approach appropriate? Should courts 
attempt to learn as much as they can about the works at issue, the views of relevant 
audiences, and the schools within which each author or artist is operating?11 To 
what extent should the court put a thumb on the scale—on either side—to 
recognize the cultural importance of one of the works or distributional inequities? 
Is it enough for the court to assume that its views are those of a “reasonable 
reader”12 and so incorporate nothing more into its analysis than a side-by-side 
comparison of the works? Indeed, why should the analysis even require 
reasonableness? 
A grounded sense of the reasonable reader should recognize the value of 
taking into account questions of context and meaning, including considerations of 
gender, race, socioeconomic status, sexuality, and privilege, among others.13 A 
requirement that the interpretation be “reasonable” can be read to mean that 
interpretations that the courts or dominant interpretive communities find too 
transgressive can be deemed outside artistic (and therefore legal) boundaries.14 
Andrew Gilden and Timothy Greene have highlighted the socioeconomic 
distinctions that can infect a decision about which audiences to consider, where the 
Richard Princes of the world are assumed to be engaging in legitimate creative 
activity but lesser known artists are outlaws.15 Gilden, in a separate work, also 
 
five works “do not sufficiently differ from the photographs of Cariou’s that they incorporate for us 
confidently to make a determination about their transformative nature as a matter of law”); cf. id. at 714 
(Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the legal standard but disagreeing 
with the majority’s decision not to remand all thirty works for consideration by the district court on an 
open record). 
10. Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW 
& LIT. 20, 21 (2013). 
11. The Court famously stated in Bleistein that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co., 188 U.S. 248, 251 (1903). Amy Adler notes that the Andy Warhol Foundation and, later, the Robert 
Rauschenberg Foundation took the position in Cariou that expert opinion was necessary to the 
transformativeness determination. Adler, supra note 8, at 609 n.226. 
12. Cf. Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781, 
785 (2008) (“[I]t is worth reminding students how much one’s own viewpoint can be mistaken for a 
general worldview . . . and how courts’ tendencies to do the same can have the effect of creating a 
market that is more homogeneous than reality suggests.”). 
13. Cf. MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD (2003); Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching 
a Reasonable Woman Standard in Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769 (2001). 
14. Holland, supra note 8, at 366 (“Social semiotic theory recognizes that the process of 
meaning-making is in many respects an exercise in power, as we struggle to define social reality.”). 
15. Andrew Gilden & Timothy Greene, Fair Use for the Rich and Fabulous?, 80 
 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 98 (2013) (contrasting Second Circuit’s apparent disregard of scholars 
who testified about the way in which Fredrik Colting’s 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye was a 
critical commentary on Catcher in the Rye with its crediting the opinions of famous artists and celebrities 
on Richard Prince’s merit); see also Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research to 
First to Printer_Heymann (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  9:04 AM 
346 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:343 
highlights the way in which the vocabulary of “raw materials”—used to describe the 
work of others deemed available for reappropriation—can perpetuate gender, racial, 
and other hierarchies and argues compellingly that such phrasing can suggest that 
these materials are not “deeply infused with meaning.”16 Similarly, Madhavi  
Sunder has noted that the increasing scholarly attention given to the public  
domain may have the effect of characterizing traditional knowledge “as the raw 
material of innovation—ancient, static, and natural—rather than as intellectual 
property—modern, dynamic, scientific, and cultural invention.”17 It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that earlier transformativeness analyses focused on the robustness 
of the defendant’s artistic activity and vision rather than on the work and that length 
of time in the artistic world (and/or associated recognition and reputation) would 
serve as a proxy for legitimacy.18 
I. TRANSFORMATIVENESS IN U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 
We should begin, then, with a review of the doctrine. Section 107 provides 
that the “fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”19 The statute then provides four 
(now well-known) factors that “shall” be included among those used to make this 
determination: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature 
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”20 
The first factor has traditionally comprised two analyses. One is derived from 
the concluding clause and considers whether the use is commercial or 
noncommercial. Until the Court’s decision in Campbell, courts tended to assume 
that commercial uses were not fair uses, particularly given the Court’s discussion in 
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, which included a statement that 
“every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair 
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the 
copyright.”21 In Campbell, however, involving a parody by the rap group 2 Live Crew 
of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the Court pivoted away from that 
 
Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705, 763–64 (2005) (describing study in which a group 
of respondents evaluated a poem’s merits differently depending on their understanding of its 
authorship). 
16. Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355, 357 (2016). 
17. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 
100 (2007). 
18. Compare Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
20. Id. 
21. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
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language, noting that Sony “called for no hard evidentiary presumption” and that 
the commercial nature of a use instead “tends to weigh against a finding of fair use,” 
depending on the context.22 
The second, and more complex, analysis derives from the first part of the first 
factor: the purpose and character of the use. Pierre N. Leval (then a judge on the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and now a senior judge 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) contended in a 1990 article in 
the Harvard Law Review23 that courts had not to that point accorded sufficient 
importance to the first factor. Noting that “all intellectual creative activity is in part 
derivative” and that “important areas of intellectual activity” (such as philosophy 
and criticism) “are explicitly referential,”24 Judge Leval concluded that determining 
whether the defendant’s use was justified—the heart of the first factor—should 
turn “primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is 
transformative.”25 Here, Judge Leval continued, he meant that the use should not 
merely “repackage[ ] or republish[ ] the original”; rather, such a use transforms the 
original “in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings.”26 The Campbell Court, after noting that all four statutory fair  
use factors “are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright,”27 described the first factor, adopting Judge Leval’s 
“transformativeness” vocabulary but not all of his descriptive text, as asking a court 
to determine “whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original 
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in 
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’”28 The 
suggestion that this consideration should weigh heavily in the overall analysis was 
suggested by the Court’s further statement that “the more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may 
weigh against a finding of fair use.”29 
In the years following the Court’s opinion in Campbell, courts considered how 
best to determine whether a second work indeed changed the original work by 
contributing a “new expression, meaning, or message.”30 Many courts focused on 
 
22. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994). 
23. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
24. Id. at 1109. 
25. Id. at 1111. 
26. Id. 
27. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
28. Id. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass 1841)) (other citations 
omitted). 
29. Id. 
30. Many commentators have also provided insight on this question. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 
8; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 750 (2011) 
(“The test quite clearly requires the court to identify the expressive purpose for which the author of the 
copyrighted work created that work and the expressive purpose for which the defendant copied from 
the work, and then to compare the two to determine if the defendant’s expressive purpose materially 
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the defendant’s activities or intent: What message did the defendant intend to 
communicate through his or her use of the plaintiff’s work?31 How did he or she 
incorporate it? What changes did he or she make? In some cases, the presence or 
absence of this evidence was dispositive. For example, in two cases involving the 
appropriation artist Jeff Koons, Koons’s inability in the first case, Rogers v. Koons,32 
to provide persuasive testimony as to his intent led to a judgment in the plaintiff’s 
favor; by the time of the second case, Blanch v. Koons,33 Koons (or his lawyers) had 
figured out that the key to success was a cogent, artistically plausible story about 
what he intended to communicate through his work.34 (The fact that Jeff Koons 
had, by the time of Blanch, become a more well-known appropriation artist was also 
likely a factor in the decision.35) 
This approach hit a snag, however, in Cariou v. Prince. Patrick Cariou, a 
professional photographer, published a book of photographs taken during the six 
years he spent in Jamaica. Many of the photographs were of Rastafarian individuals; 
the photographs’ existence, Cariou testified, resulted from the relationships that he 
had been able to develop with the subjects.36 The resulting book, titled Yes, Rasta, 
was published in 2000, to apparently little notice. Richard Prince, a well-known 
appropriation artist represented by the Gagosian Gallery, mounted a show at the 
Eden Rock hotel in St. Barths from December 2007 to February 2008. The show 
included a collage titled Canal Zone (2007), which “consisted of 35 photographs 
torn from Yes, Rasta and attached to a wooden backer board.”37 Prince had painted 
over some parts of the photographs and/or used only part of some of the 
photographs. Canal Zone (2007) was the prelude to a Canal Zone series comprising 
30 works, 28 of which incorporated 41 images from Yes, Rasta—some almost in 
their entirety and some only as parts of a collage. Twenty-two of Prince’s works 
 
differs from that of the author. But neither the test nor precedent provides dispositive rules for how 
broad the relevant categories of expressive purpose should be, and just how different the defendant’s 
expressive purpose must be from that of the author to qualify as a transformative use.”). 
31. See, e.g., Educ. Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan, Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 731, 736 n.6  
(D. Md. 1997) (suggesting that the “purpose and character of the use” derives from the defendant’s 
“goals and intent”). 
32. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
33. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
34. Id. at 253 (“Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch’s image as fodder 
for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media.”). 
35. See Adler, supra note 8, at 581 & n.102 (identifying the change in Koons’s reputation in 
between the two cases as a factor contributing to Koons’s win in Blanch and wondering whether “courts 
get worried about being on the wrong side of cultural matters”); cf. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS IN COURT 
177–79 (2016) (discussing differing outcomes in the two cases and noting that the most obvious 
explanation is the intervention of the Campbell opinion). 
36. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013). 
37. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d, 714 F.3d 694 (2d  
Cir. 2013). 
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were shown at the Gagosian Gallery, and many of those were featured in the 
gallery’s exhibition catalog.38 
Having become aware of Prince’s works when an interested gallery owner 
decided to forgo a show with Cariou because, she assumed, he was already working 
with Prince,39 Cariou sued Prince, the Gagosian Gallery, Larry Gagosian, and 
Rizzoli International Publications, Inc., for copyright infringement. (Rizzoli was 
later voluntarily dismissed.) On cross-motions for summary judgment, Prince raised 
a defense of fair use, which the district court rejected, holding both Prince and the 
Gagosian defendants liable for direct infringement and the Gagosian defendants 
also secondarily liable.40 
Prince had not availed himself of the strategy employed by Jeff Koons in 
Blanch. During his deposition, he was asked repeatedly about his intent in 
incorporating Cariou’s photographs into his own work, and each time he disclaimed 
any such intent.41 Before the district court, his attorneys argued that the court could 
still find Prince’s work transformative of Cariou’s work notwithstanding the lack of 
evidence as to Prince’s intent to comment on Cariou’s work. But the district court 
rejected this argument, finding that no previous case had so held, and thus 
concluded that Prince’s paintings could be transformative “only to the extent that 
they comment on the Photos; to the extent they merely recast, transform, or adapt 
the Photos, Prince’s Paintings are instead infringing derivative works.”42 Because 
the court had no evidence before it indicating Prince’s intent to comment on 
Cariou’s photographs, the court found that Prince’s works were overall minimally 
transformative, thus weighing against a finding of fair use.43 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court took too restrictive 
a view of transformativeness in requiring commentary on the plaintiff’s work. “The 
law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in 
order to be considered transformative,” wrote the court, “and a secondary work 
may constitute a fair use even if it serves some purpose other than those (criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research) identified in the 
preamble to the statute.”44 Moreover, the court held, the fact that Prince claimed in 
his deposition to have had no particular intent with respect to Cariou’s work was 
not dispositive. Rather, wrote the court, “[w]hat is critical is how the work in 
 
38. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 344; Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699 n.2 (noting that there were 30, not 
29, works at issue). 
39. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704. 
40. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
41. Prince Deposition Transcript at 338:9–12, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337  
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Q: And just again, what is your intent, what are 
you changing [the original work] into? A: To make great artworks that make people feel good.”); id. at 
339:11–12 (“[I]n any artwork I don’t think there’s any one message.”); id. at 354:17–18 (“I don’t really 
make comments with any of my work.”). 
42. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
43. Id. at 350. 
44. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706. 
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question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say 
about a particular piece or body of work. Prince’s work could be transformative 
even without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even without 
Prince’s stated intention to do so.”45 The key task, the court held, was not to confine 
its consideration to the defendant’s explanation but instead to “examine how the 
artworks may ‘reasonably be perceived’ in order to assess their transformative 
nature.”46 
With this, the court took on for itself the role of comparing the two sets of 
works, concluding that twenty-five of the thirty works from Prince “manifest[ed] 
an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs” and so were 
transformative as a matter of law.47 (The decision regarding the remaining five 
works was remanded to the district court.48) The court’s focus on aesthetics was not 
deeply tied to a consideration of message or meaning. Rather, as the court 
concluded: 
Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and landscape 
photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their 
surrounding environs, Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, 
are hectic and provocative. Cariou’s black-and-white photographs were 
printed in a 9 1/2” x 12” book. Prince has created collages on canvas that 
incorporate color, feature distorted human and other forms and settings, 
and measure between ten and nearly a hundred times the size of the 
photographs. Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and 
media are fundamentally different and new compared to the photographs, 
as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.49 
Judge Wallace, while agreeing with the majority as to the correct legal standard, 
parted ways with the majority on two issues: (1) the majority’s decision to judge for 
itself whether the works were transformative ( Judge Wallace would have sent all 
thirty back to the district court) and the apparent devaluing of Prince’s deposition 
testimony. While acknowledging that such statements may be self-serving, Judge 
Wallace found them to be “relevant to the transformativeness analysis.”50 
The Seventh Circuit has been critical of the decision, stating pointedly in a 
2014 opinion that transformativeness is “not one of the statutory factors, though 
the Supreme Court mentioned it in [Campbell ] ,” and characterizing the Cariou court 
as having “run with the [Campbell Court’s] suggestion,”51 to the detriment of the 
 
45. Id. at 707. 
46. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994)). 
47. Id. at 706. 
48. The case settled in March 2014. Brian Boucher, Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou  
v. Prince Is Settled, ART IN AMERICA (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-
features/news/landmark-copyright-lawsuit-cariou-v-prince-is-settled/ [https://perma.cc/SU4C-
6XMC]. 
49. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706. 
50. Id. at 713 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
51. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). As Rebecca Tushnet has 
astutely observed, saying that the Supreme Court “mentioned” transformativeness in Campbell is like 
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derivative works right in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).52 But many other courts that have 
engaged with the Cariou decision since its publication have followed the Second 
Circuit’s lead by assuming that the court itself is the “reasonable reader” of the 
Second Circuit’s holding and thus resolving the issue without resort to any evidence 
beyond the works themselves. For these courts, the perceived need for only a side-
by-side comparison means that the transformativeness question can be resolved at 
an early stage of the case—even on the pleadings, assuming both works are 
incorporated by reference.53 
 
saying that “Article III courts [are] merely ‘mentioned’ in the Constitution.” Rebecca Tushnet, Content, 
Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 886 (2015). 
52. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758. But see Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as Fair Use Blueprint?, 90  
WASH. L. REV. 597, 610 (2015) (“The transformation involved in making a derivative is usually one of 
form or medium, offering the same work in a new version, form, medium, or shape, rather than offering 
information or commentary about the original. . . . The classic understanding of derivatives is that they 
are works that represent the original author’s creative expression in a different medium or form to an 
audience that either is, or would be, motivated by appreciation of the original author’s creative 
expression—a novel converted into a film, a poem translated into another language, an oil painting 
photographically reproduced on paper.”); R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work 
Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 485 (2008) (concluding, after reviewing cases, that “[i]n assessing 
transformativeness, the courts generally emphasize the transformativeness of the defendant’s purpose in 
using the underlying work, rather than any transformation (or lack thereof) by the defendant of the 
content of the underlying work”). Concluding, in the case at hand, that the plaintiff had failed to argue 
that there had been any reduction in demand for his work or harm to his licensing market (factor four) 
and that the defendant had altered the photo to such an extent that little of the original remained (factor 
three), the Kienitz court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759. 
53. TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 181 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting some of the 
criticism of Cariou but concluding that, in the case at hand, “even scrupulous adherence to that decision 
does not permit defendants’ use of Who’s on First? in Hand to God to be held transformative”) 
(reversing 12(b)(6) dismissal of complaint on fair use grounds but affirming dismissal on copyright 
ownership grounds); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n allegedly 
infringing work is typically viewed as transformative as long as new expressive content or message is 
apparent. This is so even where—as here—the allegedly infringing work makes few physical  
changes to the original or fails to comment on the original.”); Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 279 
F. Supp. 3d 497, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[A]lthough discovery might yield additional information about 
plaintiffs’ intent, such information is unnecessary to resolve the fair use issue; all that is needed is the  
parties’ pleadings, copies of [the two works], and the relevant case law.”) (finding the second work to 
be a parody and thus transformative); Adjmi v. DLT Entertainment Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d 512, 516 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (in suit alleging that play infringed television show “Three’s Company,” on motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, court relied on nine seasons of the show, the script, and some reviews of 
the play, “each incorporated by reference in the pleadings”); id. at 532 n.13 (“In making this 
determination, the Court notes that it does not rely on reviews, user comments related to online reviews, 
images of the play, or certain of Mr. Adjmi’s statements regarding the 3C. Along the same lines, the 
Court does not require ‘intent’ evidence, purporting to explain the aims and goals animating Three’s 
Company and 3C, of the type cited by the Court of Appeals in [Blanch].”); Arrow Prods., LTD  
v. Weinstein Co., 44 F. Supp. 3d 359, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that court 
should not decide fair use on a motion for judgment on the pleadings); id. (“[T]here is a complete factual 
record before the court and discovery would not provide any additional relevant information in this 
inquiry. All that is necessary for the court to make a determination as to fair use are the two films at 
issue . . . .”). 
First to Printer_Heymann (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  9:04 AM 
352 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:343 
This has not been true of all courts, however,54 and in a recent case also 
involving Richard Prince, the court expanded the scope of the reasonable reader to 
include the reader of the opinion, noting that Prince’s work in that case “[did] not 
belong to a class of secondary works that are so aesthetically different from the 
originals that they can pass the Second Circuit’s ‘reasonable viewer’ test as a matter 
of law.”55 The court continued, “The reader of this Opinion—perhaps a reasonable 
observer—is invited to perform his or her own side-by-side comparison [of the two 
works]. That observer must conclude that [Prince’s work] does not so ‘heavily 
obscure[ ] and alter[ ]’ [the plaintiff’s work] that it renders the original photograph 
‘barely recognizable.’”56 The court concluded that because Prince had essentially 
incorporated the plaintiff’s entire photograph, “substantial evidentiary support” as 
to transformativeness—via art critics, the artist’s intent, and other sources—was 
required.57 
In general, however, the courts have tended to treat themselves as the 
reasonable observer, perhaps not surprising in a legal system that asks a court to 
reach some answer at the end of the day. But the opinions do not fully reveal an 
awareness that this task involves interpretation of some sort and so should  
be approached with consideration of the best tools for the job.58 Here, I  
mean something more than what Rebecca Tushnet calls “epistemological 
humility,”59—an awareness that other viewpoints may exist—although that, too, is 
called for. Brian Richardson reminds us, along the same lines, that conceiving of 
“the reader” as a unitary being, with no gender, race, sexuality, or socioeconomic 
class, serves to minimize the very real experiences that individual readers bring to a 
reading,60 and in previous work, I have made the same observation regarding judges 
in trademark law cases, who may see the reasonable consumer as having the same 
 
54. See, e.g., Hirsch v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 1860 (PAE), 2017 WL 3393845, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017). 
55. Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
56. Id. at 381 (quoting Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
57. Id. at 382 (quoting Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707). 
58. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 251 (1998) 
(“A truly open-minded copyright jurisprudence therefore requires explicit consciousness of 
aesthetics.”). 
59. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 22; see also Gilden, supra note 16, at 382 (“By making a 
straightforward, side-by-side comparison of the original work and likeness and the visible aesthetic 
qualities shared between them, courts exhibit confidence in their abilities to discern sufficient 
transformation without having to look deeper into the motivations of the defendant or the broader 
social value and meaning of the parties’ respective endeavors.”). 
60. Brian Richardson, The Other Reader’s Response: On Multiple, Divided, and Oppositional 
Audiences, 39 CRITICISM 31, 47–48 (1997) (“[I]n a number of particularly rich, challenging, or 
provocative texts, vastly different readers are addressed, rewarded, and, at times, confounded. 
Individual readers are frequently divided, and often maintain and negotiate multiple, contradictory 
experiences at the same time. Minority challenges to exclusionary paradigms should benefit from at 
least partial consolidation into a more expansive, non-dualistic framework, and reception theory will 
continue to suffer as long as it fails to fully incorporate these and many other reader-oriented critical 
studies.”). 
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visual abilities, dialect, and literacy levels as themselves.61 Rather, I mean a more 
deliberate, overt recognition by the court of its function as a reader in the first place, 
in conversation with other readers of the same material.62 A threshold inquiry for 
any such court should start with this question: Why should it matter how the work 
in dispute appears to the “reasonable observer” or whether any new meaning or 
message “may reasonably be perceived”? What is gained by such a limitation—and, 
more pointedly, which views are left out? 
When we talk of a reasonable person in tort law more generally, we are 
referring to a legal construct that sets a standard of care. From a law-and-economics 
perspective, by saying one must act reasonably, we are saying that one must take 
those precautions that are cost-justified. To hire round-the-clock security personnel 
to guard against a microscopic chance of minor injury incurs too much cost and so 
is not required by a standard of reasonable care. From a rights-based perspective, 
taking reasonable care might inhere in what we, as members of a community, expect 
from one another in light of generally accepted individual limitations.63 We expect 
those who create a risk of harm to others—say, by driving a vehicle—to take care 
to avoid injury to others; we expect a child to take only those precautions expected 
for her age.64 In trademark law, we use the “reasonable consumer” as a lens through 
which to determine what is lawful or unlawful behavior for a putative infringer. As 
in tort law, we don’t expect defendants to incur the cost of minimizing confusion 
for consumers who act unreasonably—who see similarities that most would not or 
who refuse to notice what is directly presented to them. It is not that the experiences 
of unreasonable consumers are invalid or untruthful; it is that the law will not require 
a putative defendant to take their confusion into account. 
But what work is reasonableness doing in a transformativeness inquiry? The 
limitation of viewpoints on transformativeness to those of a “reasonable observer” 
may contribute to establishing the line between lawful and unlawful use, but the 
Cariou court did not seem to be establishing the reasonable observer as a metric by 
which future defendants should tailor their actions. In other words, unlike in the 
scenarios just described, the reasonable observer is not establishing a standard of 
conduct to follow or locus for potential harm. When a court finds fair use based on 
transformativeness, it is not saying that the defendant acted reasonably in her artistic 
choices or that she took cost-effective precautions to avoid encroaching on the 
plaintiff’s rights. (If anything, these considerations attach to the third fair use factor, 
 
61. Heymann, supra note 12. 
62. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 
708–09 (2012) (“Right when interpretation is most needed, courts abandon interpretation, or at least 
think they have no need to engage in it.”); Zahr Kassim Said, Only Part of the Picture: A Response to 
Professor Tushnet’s Worth a Thousand Words, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 349 (2013) [hereinafter Said, 
Only Part of the Picture] (expanding Tushnet’s analysis from visual images to include text). See generally 
Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2015). 
63. Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271, 274 (2012) 
(contrasting rights-based theories of negligence with instrumentalist theories of negligence). 
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
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which asks whether the defendant took too much of the plaintiff’s work for her 
purposes.) Nor does the limitation seem related to the mode of the defendant’s 
argument, as it would if the transformativeness inquiry focused on the defendant’s 
purpose; in such a case, a court might ask whether the use the defendant made was 
reasonable in light of her intended purpose or justification. But from a  
reader-response perspective, what would an “unreasonable observer,” by contrast, 
conclude after viewing two works? If the works of Richard Prince or Sherrie Levine, 
which often appropriate wholesale the work of others, are considered to be 
transformative by those knowledgeable about contemporary art, what conclusion 
as to transformativeness would be unreasonable, given the breadth of discursive or 
interpretive communities? 
Indeed, it would be curious were a court to deem a reading of a work 
unreasonable if an interpretive community had formed around that view, precisely 
because the reasonable observer in this context is not meant to set a standard of 
care. In other words, the goal of the inquiry is not to identify the “correct” or “best” 
interpretation—it is simply to ensure enough interpretive distance between the two 
works such that the second is not merely a substitute for the first.65 Thus, unlike 
with other (normative) assessments of the reasonable person, where a court could 
deem an activity unreasonable despite the fact that it had found favor among 
many,66 the existence of an interpretive community around an interpretation tilts 
the analysis in favor of transformativeness. Bleistein cautioned courts against 
substituting their preferred aesthetic assessment over others based on individual 
preferences,67 but it did not—I don’t think—anticipate that courts should decline 
to engage in any interpretive assessment whatsoever. Indeed, the transformativeness 
analysis, in requiring some conclusion by a court, requires an interpretive and/or 
aesthetic assessment that becomes, at least in part, a normative one. 
The use of reasonableness as a limitation thus seems to be best designed to 
encourage courts not simply to offer conclusions but to offer reasons: to discuss, as 
part of a discursive or interpretive community, the aspects of the two works that 
lead the court to conclude that the second alters the first with new meaning or 
 
65. In this regard, the analysis under the first fair use factor and the fourth fair use factor are 
interrelated. See Leval, supra note 52, at 602 (noting that the first and fourth factors are “two facets of 
one complex question” in that “[t]he greater the divergence of the objectives of the copying from those 
of the original, the less likely that the secondary work will compete in the original’s exclusive markets”); 
id. at 605 (noting that “Campbell characterizes the first factor inquiry as subservient to the fourth”); 
Jonathan Francis, Note, On Appropriation: Cariou v. Prince and Measuring Contextual Transformation 
in Fair Use, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 681, 712 (2014) (contending that courts should use market value 
as evidence of transformativeness). Audiences who interpret a work as transformative rather than as 
derivative might also represent a different market for the second work, and courts that place extra 
emphasis on the fourth factor might view the reasonable observer through a “harm to the market” lens. 
66. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (“Courts must in the end say what 
is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their 
omission.”). 
67. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
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message, and ideally to engage with views that conclude otherwise.68 By reasons, I 
do not mean justifications; the court is not being asked to square its interpretation 
with an existing rule or principle.69 (A court adhering to the common law tradition 
must, of course, be cognizant of the fact that it is expected to follow, and to create, 
precedent, but the nature of the transformativeness inquiry makes it difficult to 
derive any larger principles from an individual case beyond the definition of the 
term itself.70) A reader-focused view of interpretation entails reasoning because it 
involves a discursive process by which readings are contested within and among 
interpretive communities. Providing the reasons for a particular interpretation is 
what makes possible the discourse that, I contend, the transformativeness inquiry 
necessarily contemplates. 
II. READER RESPONSE AND INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 
In previous work, I suggested that transformativeness “should not be a binary 
concept”; rather, “the relevant question should be the degree of transformativeness—
the amount of interpretive distance that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work 
creates.”71 If that distance is great enough such that a separate discursive or 
interpretive community exists around the second work, that distance suggests that 
transformation has occurred.72 This aligns with what is typically described as reader-
response theory, which “shift[s] the emphasis from the productive to the receptive 
process, stressing the creative and transformative activities of the reader, who does 
not recreate the subjectivity materialized into a written text, but produces a new 
subjectivity, a product of the interaction between text and reader,”73 and in 
particular Stanley Fish’s much analyzed (and often critiqued74) theory of interpretive 
 
68. See LOUISE M. ROSENBLATT, THE READER, THE TEXT, THE POEM: THE TRANSACTIONAL 
THEORY OF THE LITERARY WORK 146 (1978) (offering the view that rather than “thinking of the text 
as the medium of communication between author and reader,” we should instead “consider the text as 
an even more general medium of communication among readers”). 
69. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995). 
70. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common 
with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42  
B.C. L. REV. 1, 69 (2000) (“[I]t is difficult to understand how a finding in one [copyright] case will aid 
others in any but the vaguest of ways.”). I do not mean by this to discount the very real impact that a 
judicial decision on fair use can have both on the parties before the court and on others attempting to 
use the decision as a guide to future behavior. 
71. Heymann, supra note 7, at 449. 
72. Id. 
73. Gabriele Schwab, Reader-Response and the Aesthetic Experience of Otherness, 3  
STAN. LIT. REV. 107, 114 (1986). 
74. See, e.g., Terry Eagleton, The Estate Agent: Stanley Fish and His Trouble with Principles, in 
POSTMODERN SOPHISTRY: STANLEY FISH AND THE CRITICAL ENTERPRISE 181 (Gary A. Olson & 
Lynn Worsham eds., 2004). 
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communities,75 of which Janice Radway’s pioneering work on romance novels is but 
one example.76 
Fish’s theory, in the extreme way in which he has historically presented it, runs 
the risk of seeming hopelessly relativistic. Fish takes the position that all interpretive 
activity results from the strategies employed by the interpretive community of which 
the reader is a part. In this sense, one might conclude that no reader interprets with 
complete agency and that interpretive activity is simply the engagement of contested 
readings of a work, none having any primacy over any other except to the extent its 
proponents can persuade others of its superiority.77 ( Judicial opinion writing at the 
appellate level is but one example, whereby the interpretation deemed correct is the 
one that is able to garner the votes of a majority of the panel, the correctness of 
which (so defined) can never be certain until the day the opinion is released.) This 
result, coupled with the acknowledged difficulty of defining an interpretive 
community in anything but a self-referential way (the community is defined by the 
interpretation in which it engages) has led critics to characterize the theory as 
unhelpful.78 
But recall the limits of our consideration here. The transformativeness inquiry, 
as it is currently envisioned by courts, is not seeking to determine the meaning of a 
particular work, in the same way that a court is asked to give the meaning of a 
statute, which meaning then necessarily controls future interpretations until the 
statute is amended or the opinion is overturned.79 Rather, the inquiry is seeking a 
degree of difference in interpretations, a question that is necessarily relativistic. 
Thus, we need not take Fish’s theory in its strongest form to find applicability here. 
Indeed, it may be that such indeterminacy is inherent in determining whether a 
particular use is “fair.”80 
 
75. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). 
76. JANICE A. RADWAY, READING THE ROMANCE: WOMEN, PATRIARCHY, AND POPULAR 
LITERATURE (1st ed. 1984). 
77. FISH, supra note 75, at 368 (“According to the position presented here, no one can claim 
privilege for the point of view he holds and therefore everyone is obliged to practice the art of 
persuasion.”). 
78. See, e.g., Robert Scholes, Who Cares About the Text?, 17 NOVEL 171, 178 (1984) (“From my 
point of view the notion of interpretive community suggests a process that is too monolithic to 
represent adequately the agonies of choice that confront actual interpreters, who often have at their 
disposal more codes than they can use.”); see also, e.g., Dennis Patterson, You Made Me Do It: My Reply 
to Stanley Fish, 72 TEX. L. REV. 67, 69–71, 74 (1993); Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the 
Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 45 (1987). But see, e.g., Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 
Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“You don’t have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful 
communication depends on meanings shared by interpretive communities.”). 
79. Cf., e.g., William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory 
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629 (2001). 
80. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 70, at 68; Rob Kasunic, The Problem of Meaning in Non-Discursive 
Expression, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 399 (2010). 
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Is there, then, an unreasonable reading of a work? Louise Rosenblatt’s 
scholarship tells us that to be viewed as reasonable, readings must be cued  
by the text. It would be unreasonable, for example, for a reader to interpret a 
Shakespearean sonnet as a murder mystery or to interpret the Mona Lisa as 
conveying the story of the invention of the driverless car.81 Relatedly, as philosopher 
Sherri Irvin writes, the artist can be seen to have “sanctioned” particular features of 
the work—creating, in other words, the boundaries of the work to be interpreted 
by, for example, “presenting a painted canvas with a particular set of visible 
features,” painting only one side of the canvas (which implicitly suggests that only 
one side is to be displayed), or by titling the work.82 But these features do not dictate 
a particular interpretation of the work, except insofar as the features constrain the 
bounds of interpretation; “we are not free to ignore the work’s features as we 
interpret.”83 So, in her example, “[t]he artist’s sanction can determine that the paint 
flaking from a painting is properly regarded as a feature of the work that must be 
considered when we interpret, rather than a problem with the object that must be 
fixed so it does not interfere with our understanding of the work. The artist’s 
sanction does not, however, determine how that feature is to be interpreted.”84 
But Fish would note that the boundary between reasonable and unreasonable 
does not exist of its own accord; rather, it exists because the activity of interpretation 
“is determined by the literary institution which at any one time will authorize only a 
finite number of interpretative strategies.”85 How are these acceptable strategies 
determined? The process is dynamic: 
The point is that while there is always a category of things that are not done 
(it is simply the reverse or flip side of the category of things that are done), 
the membership in that category is continually changing. It changes 
laterally as one moves from subcommunity to subcommunity, and it 
changes through time when once interdicted interpretive strategies are 
admitted into the ranks of the acceptable.86 
 
81. ROSENBLATT, supra note 68; see also Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in 
Copyright Law, 102 IOWA L. REV. 605, 635 (2017) (“The reader comes along and makes the text mean 
something, but she cannot do so with total freedom, or disregard for the textual cues.”). 
82. Sherri Irvin, The Artist’s Sanction in Contemporary Art, 63 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 
315, 319 (2005). 
83. Id. at 319–20, 323. Irvin distinguishes “sanction” from “intention”: 
[I]f an artist intended that the artwork have a particular feature but failed to act effectively 
on that intention either through the presentation of the object or through other actions or 
communications, then a sanction has not been established, and the artist’s intention is 
irrelevant to the nature of the work. 
Id. at 321. But see K.E. GOVER, ART AND AUTHORITY: MORAL RIGHTS AND MEANING IN 
CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ART 123 (2018) (“[T]he line of influence between artist’s sanctions and 
interpretations is more of a hermeneutic circle than a unidirectional vector. The features of the work 
that are deemed essential to it and which are fungible will depend in part on what the work is seen in 
advance to be ‘about.’”). 
84. Irvin, supra note 82, at 322. 
85. FISH, supra note 75, at 342. 
86. Id. at 343–44. 
First to Printer_Heymann (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  9:04 AM 
358 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:343 
Fish clarified later:  
[A]n interpretive community is not an entity at all—it’s not something 
awaiting your description—rather it is what emerges in the effort to answer 
a certain kind of question . . . . The interpretive community is a device of 
interrogation, and what it promises and delivers is a method. Once a 
question has been framed, the interpretive community thesis tells you that 
in order to answer it you should attend to the relevant background 
conditions—assumed definition, notions of evidence, locations of 
reputable archives, storehouses of legitimate arguments . . . senses of what 
we do around here and what it is not our business to do—within which 
the relevant actors perform.87 
Put differently, as Brian Holland has written, differences in reaction to an 
aesthetic work can sometimes be explained by “differences in semiotic 
conventions”—that is, different interpretive communities “negotiating against the 
needs and interests of that community, develop[ing] social conventions regarding 
the meaning of semiotic resources” in a work.88 
This does not mean that everything is indeterminate. Michael Bérubé writes, 
commenting on Fish, that “as any practicing member of any interpretive community 
knows, some interpretations are so widely agreed upon as to be indistinguishable 
from brute facts: ‘facts,’ on this reading, are simply interpretations that have won 
nearly unanimous consensus,”89 such as the interpretation that the phrase set apart 
at the top of the first page of an article is its title. There are, therefore, in the 
transformativeness inquiry, certain examples where, if only asymptotically, the 
interpretation approaches this level of consensus. Perhaps quoting two or three 
sentences of a book in a book review would fall into this category—a community 
practice that is so engrained that few at this point would even think to challenge the 
act (even if they might challenge the conclusions that the review draws based on the 
text). Put differently, as Gerald Graff writes, “[a]ppealing to ‘the evidence’ to settle 
disputes about ‘what is in the text’ works only if there is a consensus about what 
that evidence is.”90 It’s interpretation all the way down. 
What this means for a transformativeness analysis, then, is that for a reading 
to be “reasonable,” a court must set out the priors that help us to understand the 
interpretive community of which the court is a part. This, then, raises the question 
of what role the court should play in this effort. Is the court a census taker, 
 
87. Stanley Fish, One More Time, in POSTMODERN SOPHISTRY: STANLEY FISH AND THE 
CRITICAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 74, at 265, 276. 
88. Holland, supra note 8, at 375 (discussing the different reactions to Shepard Fairey’s “Hope” 
poster of Barack Obama). 
89. Michael Bérubé, There Is Nothing Inside the Text, or, Why No One’s Heard of Wolfgang Iser, 
in POSTMODERN SOPHISTRY: STANLEY FISH AND THE CRITICAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 74, at 11, 
18. 
90. Gerald Graff, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Stanley, in POSTMODERN 
SOPHISTRY: STANLEY FISH AND THE CRITICAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 74, at 27, 32. 
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attempting only to determine the existence of contested interpretations, or should 
the court engage with those contestations in a particular way? 
III. CONTESTED INTERPRETATIONS 
Copying, as many commentators have noted, can be fundamental to identity 
creation. When we share a creative work with others, we are saying something about 
our likes and dislikes, our preferred styles, or the cultural moments that we find 
important.91 But a court’s declaration that such a use is appropriate or inappropriate 
is not merely a legal judgment; it must inevitably also be an aesthetic and intellectual 
judgment on whether a “reasonable” reading would gain anything additional of 
value from the second work. 
To be clear, by “value,” I do not mean that the court finds the use to be worthy 
of praise. Many fair uses have involved messages and meanings that some would 
find distasteful. Rather, I mean that there exists something to grapple with, to 
engage in discourse around, that is different from what the first author’s work has 
contributed. It should not go unobserved that the mere ability to declare this status, 
and to have that declaration treated as authoritative, is an exercise of power, and 
different interpreters may be accorded different levels of authority in this regard. 
Darren Hudson Hick notes of John Cage’s work 4’33”, which consists of a score 
directing four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence by the orchestra (such 
that the audience hears only the ambient noise of the venue), that it was years after 
its first performance before the piece was recognized as falling into the category of 
“musical works.”92 Indeed, Hick continues, “Cage had proposed an ontology for 
the work”— that it was a musical work—”but its realization was contingent upon 
buy-in from the artworld, and matters could easily have turned out otherwise.”93 
Likewise, the hierarchical position of the artist who uses another’s work (often 
deemed “appropriation”94) may succeed in narrowing or even eliminating the 
conversation that would otherwise take place. An artist who parodies or who 
otherwise uses a well-known work may be more easily seen as engendering a 
conversation around meaning, whereas an artist who uses a lesser-known work may 
be seen to transform only in the physical sense; the second artist’s work is the one 
 
91. Mark Alfino, Deep Copy Culture, in THE AESTHETICS AND ETHICS OF COPYING 19, 29 
(Darren Hudson Hick & Reinold Schmücker eds., 2016) (“Without exaggeration, one could say that we 
are not only the products of our interactions with our environments and artifacts, but we spend a great 
deal of energy producing and reproducing social meanings through citation, expression, and 
consumption. We are copy creatures.”). 
92. Darren Hudson Hick, The Nature of Copying and the Singular Literary Work, in THE 
AESTHETICS AND ETHICS OF COPYING, supra note 91, at 119, 126. 
93. Id. 
94. The fact that the verb form of “appropriate” and the adjectival form of “appropriate” share 
a lexical unit but not necessarily a meaning should not go unnoticed, nor should the difference conveyed 
by the use of “appropriation” rather than “borrowing.” 
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that is seen as creating meaning.95 Moreover, the “meaning” of a work long 
embedded in critical consciousness may be assumed rather than interrogated, such 
that a use of the work that appears obviously oppositional also seems obviously 
reasonable. (Zahr Said makes a related point with respect to Gone with the Wind, the 
“long and storied reception history” of which enabled the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit to take a nonformalist approach to determining whether 
The Wind Done Gone, which retells the story from the perspective of a slave, was a 
fair use.96) 
There is a risk, then, that an interpretive community keenly aware of  
these dynamics may attempt to characterize another community’s view as 
“unreasonable”—as, indeed, an early proponent of the status of 4’33” as a musical 
work would have been deemed until time caught up with that view.97 An interpretive 
community unaware of the complexities of commentary may see an unauthorized 
derivative work where others see transformativeness. Likewise, reliance by courts 
on expert testimony risks privileging dominant or entrenched views over others if 
the expert testimony is used not as a means of educating the court about the 
existence of particular interpretive communities but rather as an imprimatur.98 The 
exercise is inherently complicated, and rightly so.99 
The importance of a broad view of transformativeness is particularly 
important, as Rebecca Tushnet writes, “to preserve equal freedom of interpretation 
 
95. Olufunmilayo Arewa, Curation, Music, and Law 19 (Mar. 15, 2017) (manuscript),  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932520 [https://perma.cc/TFN3-6VUX] 
(“Lack of familiarity with African American music and culture in the broader American society has 
given collectors of such culture and other intermediaries tremendous power and latitude to curate 
cultural material to bolster their ideologies and conceptions about black culture.”); see also Gilden, supra 
note 16, at 355. 
96. Said, Only Part of the Picture, supra note 62, at 362 & n.54 (citing Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
97. Lisa Jones, Appropriation and Derogation: When Is It Wrong to Appropriate?, in THE 
AESTHETICS AND ETHICS OF COPYING, supra note 91, at 187, 204 (noting that once the viewer has 
engaged with Prince’s Canal Zone series, it will be difficult to see Patrick Cariou’s photographs “without 
imagining, involuntarily, the collaged additions and scribblings that Prince added to those images in  
his work”); cf. Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77  
TEX. L. REV. 923, 926 (1999) (arguing that treating users of cultural material as speakers engaged in 
their own acts of communication “passes over the interest of a vast number of non-owners in having 
cultural objects with stable meanings”). 
98. Tushnet, supra note 51, at 890 (“[I]t is vital to recognize that different audiences may take 
different meanings from the same work, so that what seems like a critical transformation to one group 
may seem trivial to another.”); Erlend Lavik & Stef van Gompel, On the Prospects of Raising the 
Originality Requirement in Copyright Law: Perspectives from the Humanities, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 387, 428 (2013) (“[I]t is also misguided to think that greater aesthetic expertise automatically 
generates more sure-footed, coherent, and predictable verdicts. Indeed, the most sophisticated 
historical and philosophical studies of aesthetic judgment often complicate matters more than clarify 
them; they regularly seek to challenge, rather than obtain, certainty; and their conclusions tend to be 
tentative and provisional, highlighting the contingencies upon which apparent certitudes rest.”). 
99. D.N. Rodowick, The Value of Being Disagreeable, 39 CRITICAL INQUIRY 592, 601 (2013) 
(“Reason-giving is messy, conflictual, contentious, and contingent—in short, disagreeable.”). 
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for all [interpretive] communities, whether federal judges are part of them or not.”100 
Put otherwise, engaging with interpretive communities on the various readings that 
might be made of a work can highlight how what might otherwise be seen as a 
derivative is actually responding to the work in some fashion. This is particularly 
important when the second work represents an attempt to respond to a dominant 
theme or paradigm (a paradigm that copyright discourse might reinforce when it 
refers to the plaintiff’s work as the “original” work). 
For example: In 1937, the African-American jazz vocalist Maxine Sullivan 
“started a vogue,” as Life magazine reported it, by singing the familiar Scottish song 
“Loch Lomond” as a swing number.101 Life noted that her recording “became a 
favorite of the college boys” and “set jazz bands to swinging every folk tune from 
Annie Laurie to Funiculi Funicula.”102 The nightclub reporter for the New York 
Times wrote in 1937 that “[w]ithout offending any . . . sensibilities, [Sullivan] sings 
and plays the old . . . songs in a slightly swingy tempo and the resultant product has 
been approved by such kindred souls as Benny Goodman and Robert Benchley.”103 
But on March 8, 1938, when Sullivan sang the song as part of the CBS radio show 
“Saturday Night Swing,” the station manager of WJR radio in Detroit took her off 
the air in the middle of “Loch Lomond” because “‘it was sacrilegious to swing a 
traditional song.’”104 Perhaps the manager’s objection was a publicity stunt, 
designed to boost ratings—it led two weeks later to a “sing-off” that pitted the CBS 
studio in New York, playing swing versions of songs, against the Detroit station’s 
“traditional” versions105—but the implications of the station manager’s position did 
not go unnoticed. The Afro-American newspaper in Baltimore wrote at the time: 
Four years ago this column called attention to the fact that so-called Negro 
spirituals were being used as a basis of dance tunes. . . . But while most of 
us were visibly shocked by the outrageous use of sacred hymns for dance 
music, everybody else enjoyed the popular craze. Now that the swing fever 
has reached such ancient folk ballads as ‘Annie Laurie’ and ‘Loch Lomond,’ 
 
100. Tushnet, supra note 51, at 890. 
101. A Negro Girl Swings a Scottish Tune and Blows Up a Radio Storm, LIFE, Mar. 21, 1938, at 
19. 
102. Id. 
103. Jack Gould, News of the Night Clubs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1937, § 11, at 4. 
104. PATRICK BURKE, COME IN AND HEAR THE TRUTH: JAZZ AND RACE ON 52ND STREET 
99 (2008); see also WJR Cuts Off “Swinger,” RADIO DAILY, Mar. 10, 1938, at 2 (explaining that Tommy 
Dorsey was also taken off the air the next day as his band swung “Comin’ Thru the Rye.”). 
105. Benny Goodman was to have led the CBS band but had to drop out due to scheduling 
difficulties. Before then, he said, “Swing bands are re-popularizing the old ballads. We are merely 
bringing these old tunes into the tempo of today.” To Make It Real Hot, I’ll Get Maxine to Sing, AFRO-
AMERICAN, Mar. 19, 1938, at 10; see also Melody Versus Swing Is Tuneful Battle, AFRO-AMERICAN, Mar. 
26, 1938, at 10; It’s Fitzpatrick’s Story, RADIO DAILY, Mar. 23, 1938, at 5 (relaying that the station 
manager later reported to Radio Daily that 85 percent of the mail and telegrams he had received after 
the program aired “objected to swing music and were in favor of the ‘songs our mothers used to sing.’”). 
One commentator suggested that the station manager ginned up the controversy to garner publicity for 
his station and listenership for the “Swing vs. Sentiment” program. Robert I. Fitzhenry, The 
Emancipation of Swing, MICH. DAILY, Mar. 20, 1938, at 4. 
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Scottish and Irish elements in our population are squawking loud and 
long.106 
Sullivan’s appropriation of traditionally White music was interpreted by 
modern commentators as finding a voice, not erasing one. Writer Patrick Burke, for 
example, characterized her performance as conveying “that black musicians 
deserved to be seen as conscious artists with the ability to adapt any material to their 
own purpose, rather than as natural artists who were supposedly limited by their 
own racial proclivities.”107 Indeed, the act of appropriation could itself have been 
seen as a communicative act, responding, as the Afro-American newspaper 
suggested, to the earlier use of spirituals as dance music. 
Failure to fully appreciate the kind of perspective that Burke provides is, 
perhaps, evident in Campbell itself, in which the Court, having found 2 Live Crew’s 
“Pretty Woman” to be a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman,” remanded 
for further consideration of whether the former was, nevertheless, a market 
substitute for the rap version of the latter and thus an unlawful derivative work. In 
so doing, the Court suggested the possibility that 2 Live Crew was engaging in 
critical commentary of the Orbison work but using an impermissible genre. Justice 
Kennedy, concurring, expressed particular concern that 2 Live Crew was doing 
nothing more than recording an old song in a new key, all but erasing the group’s 
own voice.108 As Richard Schur suggests, this result shows little consideration of the 
function of the genre itself as a means of commentary, such that the two cannot be 
considered separately.109 
More attentive in this regard is the decision of the court in Abilene Music,  
Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.110 At issue was whether hip-hop artist 
Ghostface Killah’s song The Forest engaged in a transformative use of the first three 
lines of What a Wonderful World, recorded most famously by Louis Armstrong. The 
court’s analysis takes account of the way in which The Forest responds to What a 
Wonderful World, noting that despite the latter’s popularity, “not everybody 
subscribes to its message of a pastoral world of ‘skies of blue and clouds of white,’ 
 
106. The Man Who Is Full Disdains a Honeycomb—Proverbs 28:7, AFRO-AMERICAN, Mar. 26, 
1938, at 4. 
107. BURKE, supra note 104, at 100. 
108. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592–93 (1994) (“2 Live Crew’s song 
comprises not only parody but also rap music, and the derivative market for rap music is a proper focus 
of enquiry.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We should not make it 
easy for musicians to exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a valuable 
commentary on the original. Almost any revamped modern version of a familiar composition can be 
construed as a ‘comment on the naiveté of the original,’ because of the difference in style and because 
it will be amusing to hear how the old tune sounds in the new genre. Just the thought of a rap version 
of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony or ‘Achy Breaky Heart’ is bound to make people smile.” (citation 
omitted)). 
109. RICHARD L. SCHUR, PARODIES OF OWNERSHIP: HIP-HOP AESTHETICS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 137–38 (2009) (suggesting that the Court in Campbell “continue[d] the 
fiction of an unraced intellectual property law”). 
110. Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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where all men are brothers and the sound of ‘babies cryin’’ is music to one’s ears.”111 
Highlighting the language from Campbell that the touchstone is “whether a parodic 
character may reasonably be perceived,”112 the Abilene Music court emphasized that 
the relevant question “is not whether Ghostface Killah intended The Forest purely 
as a parody of Wonderful World, but whether, considered as a whole, The Forest 
‘differs [from the original] in a way that may reasonably be perceived as 
commenting, through ridicule, on what a viewer might reasonably think’ is the 
unrealistically uplifting message of Wonderful World.”113 In a lengthy analysis, 
involving interpretation of the themes, lyrics, music, and intonations of each 
song,114 evidence from the parties, reviews referencing the alterations of the 
originals, and consideration of the audiences for each song, the court determined 
that The Forest was a transformative parody and, ultimately, constituted fair use of 
What a Wonderful World.115 
A similar analysis took place in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions,116 
involving a series of photographs by Thomas Forsythe, many of them depicting an 
unclothed Barbie doll in various scenes with vintage kitchen items. Mattel, which 
had conducted a mall-intercept survey in which respondents were shown copies of 
the photographs, argued that because only some of the respondents perceived the 
photographs as a parody, the works were not transformative.117 The court rejected 
this argument, stating that “[t]he issue of whether a work is a parody is a question 
of law, not a matter of public majority opinion.”118 The use of surveys in this 
context, the court continued “would allow majorities to determine the parodic 
nature of a work and possibly silence artistic creativity.”119 The court then set forth 
in considerable detail the difference in meanings it saw between that conveyed by a 
Barbie doll and those conveyed by Forsythe, ultimately concluding that the artist 
engaged in fair use. 
My point here is not to persuade the reader that these results were correct, 
although I think they were, or to suggest that the courts did enough to ensure that 
they were familiar with a range of responses to each work. It is to suggest, however, 
that this level of engagement with the works at issue succeeds in positioning the 
court in dialogue with other readers. This, I think, is the most we can ask of an 
analysis that aims to describe what a “reasonable observer” perceives. 
 
111. Id. at 87. 
112. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582. 
113. Abilene Music, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (quoting Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 
F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
114. See Robert Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright 
Law: A Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 369 n.181 (2015) (characterizing 
Abilene Music as an example of formalistic analysis). 
115. Abilene Music, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 89–92. 
116. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
117. Id. at 801. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Transformativeness, to the extent it remains part of the fair use analysis in 
copyright, is first and foremost an interpretive exercise. Although one could 
evaluate whether a work has been transformed, in the lay sense, through a mere 
comparison of features—much as one might use the word “transformed” to 
describe a major house renovation—that use of transformed in the fair use context 
would make the first factor look too much like the third factor (the amount of the 
copyrighted work used). Rather, the first factor, by focusing on the purpose and 
character of the use, is asking something different—it is asking how the defendant’s 
work contributes in a different way from the plaintiff’s work to “promote the 
Progress of Science.” And that, as the Court indicated in Campbell, requires 
consideration of how the works are received, which requires, in turn, consideration 
of interpretive communities.120 
These issues are not, of course, unique to copyright law. Any time a court or 
other adjudicatory body is asked to rule something within or outside the boundaries 
of expressive activity, it is being asked to engage in interpretation, a task that will 
asymptotically approach the best answer the more it reflects a familiarity with 
multiple interpretive communities. The decision that Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day 
parade constitutes expressive activity121 implies, as Mark Tushnet writes, “that the 
First Amendment’s coverage depends on whether observers impute ‘meaning’ to 
what they see. . . . The reasonable observer must understand that the object on view 
is expressive, though not all observers will agree on what it expresses.”122 
Determining Constantin Brancusi’s Bird in Space to be a work of art rather than a 
“manufactured object of metal” required the tribunal to take account of new 
schools of art and their influence “[w]hether or not [it was] in sympathy with these 
newer ideas.”123 The Court’s conclusion in Pope v. Illinois that the third question in 
the tripartite test for whether material is obscene (“whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value”) should be judged 
by “whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material, taken as a 
whole”124 inspired a forceful dissent from three of the Justices, who recognized that, 
in such inquires, to talk of “a reasonable person” was impracticable. Rather, the 
 
120. Cf. Adler, supra note 8, at 563 (contending that “the move to the transformative analysis, 
thought by many to be the solution to fair use woes, has actually made things worse for the visual arts” 
because the analysis “requires courts to search for ‘meaning’ and ‘message’ when one goal of so much 
current art is to throw the idea of stable meaning into play”). 
121. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 577 
(1995) (“[I]n the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade’s overall message 
is distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression is perceived by 
spectators as part of the whole.”). 
122. Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 201 (2012). 
123. Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428, 431 (Cust. Ct. 1928); see also Stéphanie Giry, 
An Odd Bird, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2002, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-
October-2002/story_giry_sepoct2002.msp [https://perma.cc/3ZBZ-F4CZ]. 
124. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 498, 501 (1987). The tripartite test was developed in Miller  
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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dissent urged, the standard should be whether “some reasonable persons could 
consider [the material] as having serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value”; otherwise, a juror “might well believe that the majority of the population 
who find no value in [controversial works] are more reasonable than the minority 
who do find value.”125 
The Cariou court referenced the views of “the reasonable observer.” Taking a 
cue from the Pope dissenters, we should instead think of this lens as the views of 
“some reasonable observers.” Courts that do not situate themselves as part of an 
interpretive community, engaging with other observers, risk having their 
transformativeness decisions seen as a fait accompli, rather than as a reasonable 
conclusion based on available evidence. This is, I think, the way to give meaning to 
the concept of a “reasonable observer” or meaning that may “reasonably be 
perceived” in a world where every interpretative community has the ability to 
contest meaning but where existing structures may privilege the views of those 
already seen as more “reasonable.” Putting this engagement on the record 
recognizes that transformativeness is cause, not effect; that a work is ultimately not 
what it is but “what it does.”126 The result may well be that fair use disputes will be 
less frequently resolved at earlier stages of litigation if it turns out that courts feel 
more confident undertaking this task with the benefit of evidence, expert or 
otherwise, as to the existence of interpretive communities.127 Fully recognizing that 
the resulting cost is not mine to bear, I do think it is the better outcome for the 











125. Pope, 481 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
126. Jane P. Tompkins, The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of Literary Response, in 
READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POSTSTRUCTURALISM 201, 224 ( Jane  
P. Tompkins ed., 1980) (emphasis omitted); see also William Safire, On Language, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2008 (Magazine), at 20 (defining “transformative” as “having the power to transform” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
127. Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 101, 160 (2017) 
(calling on courts using reasonableness standards in constitutional analysis to inform review with 
“objective and empirical sources, and not just whatever the reviewing judge calls reasonable”). Taking 
such an approach in fair use considerations may ultimately result in limiting the scope of appellate 
review to assessing the process employed by the district court rather than the result reached, which 
itself raises the question of whether transformativeness is a factual question or a legal one. I leave further 
exploration to others. 
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